The Microsoft antitrust case focused public attention on the role of antitrust enforcement in preserving the forces of innovation in high-technology markets. Traditionally, regulators focused on whether companies artificially hiked prices or reduced output. Now, they're increasingly likely to look first at whether corporate behavior aids or impedes innovation. In this paper, we examine whether innovation has displaced short-term price effects as the focus of antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and, to the extent that it has, whether enforcement actions are any different as a result. We also ask whether enforcement actions in the area of intellectual property and innovation have been consistent with the 1995 DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property [IP Guidelines]. Finally, we consider whether recent enforcement actions identify key areas in which additional guidance from the Agencies would be desirable. We address these questions first in merger cases and then in non-merger cases.
3 cases over the period spanning the second half of the 1990s. In the first half of that decade, the agencies identified innovation as a cause to challenge a merger in only four cases. The DOJ and the FTC also initiated several non-merger antitrust enforcement actions in the later half of the 1990s that alleged significant impacts on innovation.
Although a large number of merger and non-merger enforcement actions brought by the agencies identified innovation effects, it is another question whether these actions actually turned on innovation issues. In the merger area, our investigation shows that innovation concerns were decisive in only a few cases. Most of the merger cases that alleged effects on innovation likely could have been challenged based on adverse impacts on competition in markets for existing goods and services. We do not mean to imply that innovation impacts were unimportant in these cases. Instead, we make the more limited point that the decisions to oppose these mergers likely would not have been different if innovation had been excluded from the analysis. In a few additional cases, innovation concerns led to challenges in more markets, and therefore resulted in a broader remedy, than if innovation issues had not been considered.
Several recent non-merger enforcement actions, in addition to Microsoft, have turned on innovation issues or on conduct involving intellectual property. To a considerable extent these non-merger cases reflect competition issues raised by business arrangements that combine intellectual property rights or that settle disputes arising from interfering intellectual property rights. Antitrust issues have been raised when a combination of intellectual property rights or a collective decision to support a particular industry standard creates or enhances market power, and when a settlement of an intellectual property dispute extends the life of a weak patent.
Cases such as Microsoft and Visa-MasterCard have addressed the effects of industry structures and business arrangements on the pace of innovation.
We conclude that innovation is not quite "King" at the antitrust agencies, although its role has become increasingly important and has been decisive in several merger and non-merger enforcement actions that have potentially very significant impacts for consumer welfare. We also find that the approaches followed by the antitrust Agencies in these cases are generally consistent with the principles and policies described in the IP Guidelines, although we note several areas where additional guidance would be desirable.
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In making these assessments, we emphasize that our investigation is guided by the facts as represented to us in public documents released by the antitrust Agencies. Moreover, we add the disclaimer that, as individuals involved in the drafting of the IP Guidelines (as well as in some of the enforcement actions described in this paper), we are not entirely objective evaluators of the Guidelines' role in antitrust policy. Nonetheless, we feel qualified to comment on the use of the IP Guidelines in antitrust enforcement and the value of additional guidance for antitrust policy related to innovation and intellectual property licensing.
II. KEY PRINCIPLES IN THE DOJ AND FTC GUIDELINES
Before turning to whether a focus on innovation has made any difference to antitrust enforcement, we first pause to consider whether it should, and in what ways it might. There is little doubt that technological innovation is a key driver of economic progress 2 and that an increase in the rate of technological change can offset the adverse impact on consumer welfare from supra-competitive prices. 3 Consequently, it is especially important that antitrust policy be formulated in a way that fosters rather than impedes such innovation. That does not mean that antitrust policy need necessarily be different as a result. However, high-technology markets do in fact differ from other markets in significant respects. In particular, high-technology markets are characterized by rapid rates of technological change, high fixed costs of research and development relative to the variable costs of production, knowledge spillovers, and (sometimes) strong "network effects." GROWTH 1929 GROWTH -1982 GROWTH (1985 . More recent estimates are consistent with these findings. See, e.g., Charles I. Jones, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH (1998).
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became largely moot as developments in small and personal computers undermined the economic significance of IBM's leadership in mainframe computing. 4 The high fixed costs of R&D relative to marginal production costs also has potentially important ramifications for antitrust policy. The model of perfect competition, which is the benchmark for traditional antitrust analysis, simply does not apply to many high-technology markets. If product prices equal marginal production costs, many high-tech firms could not cover the costs necessary to invent and develop the products in the first place. Put another way, market power, which is the ability to set price above marginal cost, is necessary to the survival of many high-technology industries.
Knowledge spillovers also can be important for the structure and performance of hightechnology markets. Firms that invest in research and development often create knowledge that benefits others, including their competitors. Even strong intellectual property rights may be insufficient to capture a large share of the knowledge benefits from R&D. Other ways to appropriate the benefits of knowledge are to have a large share of the production that the knowledge affects or to form alliances to share information. If so, concentrated market structures and cooperation among competitors, traditionally antitrust evils to be avoided if possible, may benefit consumers.
Yet another reason why high-technology markets may gravitate to concentrated market structures is the presence of strong "network effects," which imply that the value of a product increases with the number of consumers that purchase the product (and with the number of firms that supply products and services that complement the product). 5 These network effects, like other economies of scale, potentially benefit consumers. However, the presence of network effects, combined with the costs of switching between incompatible networks, can raise high barriers to the entry of competing networks. 6 For these reasons, high market concentration may be a natural state in high-technology markets. In the extreme, the "Schumpeterian hypothesis" that large and dominant firms promote vigorous technological progress (named after Joseph Schumpeter, who championed 6 this view in 1942) 7 suggests a much more circumspect role for antitrust policy, which is traditionally premised on the benefits of competition. Conversely, the special characteristics of high-technology markets and a concern about innovation could argue for increased antitrust vigilance, on the theory that the potential for high rates of technological change and network effects magnify the harm from conduct that slows down such change or distorts the competition to become the dominant standard.
The agencies have not formally articulated their view on how, if at all, a concern about innovation alters their approach to antitrust enforcement. They have, however, considered the analogous question of how to take into account the differences between intellectual property and other forms of property. Despite substantial differences between these forms of property, 8 they have declared their confidence that for the purpose of antitrust analysis, intellectual property is essentially comparable to any other form of property. 9 One might expect the agencies to take a similar approach to whether antitrust should be different in high-technology markets: to treat competitive markets as generally conducive to innovation and to deal with factors such as technological change, high fixed costs, knowledge spillovers, and network effects on a case-by -case basis, rather than through the broad generalizations either of the Schumpeterian hypothesis or of the arguments for stricter scrutiny. As we show below, this is indeed how the agencies have approached actual antitrust enforcement actions since 1995. The authors also agree with this general approach. There is little evidence that more concentrated markets are necessarily beneficial for research and development (although certain combinations, such as research joint ventures, have produced positive results). Furthermore, there is at least anecdotal evidence that innovation can thrive in competitive market structures. (1) intellectual property is easier to misappropriate than other forms of property; (2) a patent grants the owner a power of exclusion that, in some respects, exceeds the powers that attach to tangible property; (3) the fixed costs are typically higher and the marginal costs lower than other forms of property; (4) to commercialize a product and earn a return, a larger number of complementary inputs with some degree of market power often must be brought together, and (5) the boundaries of intellectual property defy accurate survey to a much greater extent than do those of tangible property. 12 The higher percentage of merger challenges at the FTC that include innovation as a reason for the challenge does not necessarily mean that the FTC has a more activist approach to the antitrust evaluation of innovation than does the DOJ. The Agencies tend to specialize in industries that differ in the competitive effects of industry structures on innovation.
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For comparison, Table 2 shows the number of DOJ and FTC challenges to mergers and acquisitions in the time period from the start of FY 1990 through the end of FY 1994. The agencies challenged a total of 135 mergers and acquisitions over this period (excluding bank transactions). This is about one-half of the number challenged from FY 1995 through FY 1999
and is generally consistent with the increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions that occurred in the latter half of the 1990s. More importantly for our purposes, the agencies noted that innovation was a factor in the challenges in only four cases, two by the DOJ and two by the FTC. The agencies identified innovation as a reason to challenge a merger or acquisition in only three percent of the challenges over this period. This is far below the 17.5 percent of the cases that included innovation as a reason for the challenge in the second half of the 1990s. The statistics in Tables 1 and 2 show that innovation has loomed large in the latter half of the 1990s as a stated reason for the agencies' merger enforcement policies. Yet these data are not sufficient to show that innovation concerns have been pivotal in the agencies' enforcement decisions. Whether innovation has emerged as a foundation for merger policy is not an easy question to answer because we are not privy to the agencies' hierarchy of competitive concerns, other than what they express in their public announcements. We can, however, ask a different question: based on the information in the public record, is there reason to believe that antitrust enforcement actions would have been different if the agencies did not pursue innovation as a policy concern?
9 With respect to innovation, mergers challenged by the FTC and by the DOJ can be divided into three categories.
Mergers that would reduce competition in an existing goods market.
Mergers that would reduce potential competition in an existing goods market.
Mergers that would reduce competition only in an innovation or technology market or in a goods market that does not yet exist but is predicted to exist in the future.
All antitrust impacts ultimately follow from effects on price, quality, and availability of Effect (a) addresses the same markets at issue as in effect (b), which one could characterize as goods markets that do not presently exist, but may exist in the future. Rather than addressing price effects in these markets, this element of the complaint addresses innovation effects. That is, it asks whether innovation itself will be reduced. Of course, the same question can be asked of a market in which there are already existing products, which is why the IP Guidelines note that in many cases, rather than define an innovation market, the agencies will evaluate innovation effects in a goods market.
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Effect (d) deals with horizontal competitive effects in an existing technology market.
According to the FTC, the merger would combine existing intellectual property rights held separately by Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz. These rights were alleged to be substitutes for each other but essential complements to the R&D efforts of other firms attempting to develop gene therapy products. 43 By combining their substitute technology rights, the merger would make it easier for the merged company to foreclose competition by unilaterally refusing to license potential competitors or to extract rents from gene therapy products by raising the price of their essential technology.
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Effect (c) deals with vertical effects in a technology market. According to the FTC, the combination of the parties' patent portfolios could have adverse consequences for competition even if the patents are complements rather than substitutes (meaning that having licenses from both companies would be helpful to engage in gene therapy research and development).
Without the merger, each firm could compete by licensing, inventing around, or proving invalid, the other firm's patents, and a third-party firm could compete by licensing from one firm and inventing around or invalidating the patents of the other. With the merger, a rival firm would have to license, invent around, or prove invalid, both firms' patents, which could be a much more formidable task. This is a variant of the two-level entry problem discussed in § 4.21
of the 1984 Merger Guidelines.
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With respect to each of these alleged effects, the FTC identified ways in which CibaGeigy and Sandoz would offer competition to each other in the absence of a merger or license.
The FTC's evaluation of the competition issues raised by combining the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz patent portfolios is consistent with a fundamental principle in the Intellectual Property Guidelines, namely, that a transaction may raise antitrust concerns if it eliminates competition that would have occurred in its absence. 46 The FTC alleged that the proposed merger would Antitrust: Common Goals and Uncommon Problems, Address before the Before the American Conference Institute 9th National Conference on Licensing Intellectual Property (Oct.12, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/aciippub.htm ("As long as they can play one off against the other, the potential rewards are so great that it pays the firms to continue their research. Post-merger, however, the combined entity becomes a single bottleneck. Since the research firms can no longer play one off against the other, the terms on which they can partner with the combined entity change markedly for the worse."). 44 Another case during the relevant period, Monsanto/DeKalb, appears to address similar concerns. While we have only a press release to go on, because the parties implemented the remedy immediately and obviated the need for a consent decree, that release indicates that the Justice Department was concerned about two types of competing intellectual property: (1) patents on competing methods of corn transformation, and (2) patents on competing types of corn germplasm. In each case, the concern was that " 17 have eliminated such competition. However, to the extent that Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz each owned intellectual property that might block attempts by the other party to compete in the manufacture or sale of gene therapy products, combining blocking intellectual property rights might have procompetitive benefits, such as eliminating double-marginalization and making licensing easier by combining essential patents. 47 The agencies would do a public service by elaborating on the circumstances in which the competitive concerns from eliminating potential competition are likely to be more compelling than the efficiency benefits from integrating blocking or complementary intellectual property rights.
The FTC resolved its concerns about competition in research and development of gene therapies by imposing a number of licensing conditions on the merged company. These included a requirement to grant non-exclusive licenses to one firm for patents on certain gene therapy technologies, a requirement to license several basic patents to all comers nonexclusively at low royalties, and an order that would bar Ciba, Chiron, and Sandoz from acquiring exclusive licenses for technology related to the use of specified genes for chemoresistance gene therapy products.
F. Innovation Effects in Price-Regulated Markets
The DOJ filed suit on March 23, 1998, to prevent the proposed acquisition of Northrop
Grumman by Lockheed Martin. 49 Northrop and Lockheed compete to develop, manufacture, and sell a range of electronics systems and military aircraft to the U.S. military. These include airborne early warning radar, directed infrared and on-board radio frequency countermeasures systems, the SQQ-89 antisubmarine warfare combat system, electro-optical missile warning systems, remote mine hunting systems, stealth technology, fiber-optic towed decoys, and high performance fixed-wing military aircraft. In addition, Lockheed and Northrop are also prime and sub-contractors for several military systems. The DOJ contended that the merger would make it easier for the merged company to favor its own capabilities for subsystems at the The Lockheed-Northrop case features prominently in the DOJ's evolving approach to the analysis of innovation issues. The case demonstrates that the DOJ will act to preserve the diversity of R&D efforts even if there is no clear evidence that these efforts are competitive substitutes in the design and development of new goods and services.
IV. DOJ AND FTC NON-MERGER CASES THAT INVOLVE INNOVATION
The antitrust agencies have identified innovation concerns as significant factors in several recent non-merger investigations. We discuss some of the more important examples in this section. Microsoft's browser and undermining the Java language standard to discourage its widespread adoption.
The IP Guidelines note that "The agencies would be likely to challenge a tying arrangement if: (1) the seller has market power in the tying product, (2) the arrangement has an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market for the tied product, and (3) efficiency justifications for the arrangement do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects." 58 In Microsoft , the DOJ alleged, among other things, anticompetitive impacts in the market for the tying product. The government alleged that Microsoft tied the operating system and the browser to quash the entry threat posed by the popularity of Netscape and the platform-independent Java programming language. A lesson from the Microsoft case is that future guidelines should address a broader set of possible adverse competitive impacts from tying.
The allegation that Microsoft engaged in various licensing practices that impeded
Microsoft's rivals' ability to distribute competing browsers is consistent with the IP Guidelines' discussion of exclusive dealing arrangements. According to the IP Guidelines: 60 and interference with the Java language standard. As is typically the case with predatory conduct, consumers may benefit in the short run, but the practice can have adverse impacts in the long term that more than offset the near-term benefits.
The key allegation in the Microsoft case was that Microsoft's conduct threatened to eliminate the combination of Netscape and the Java language that could enable other platforms to emerge as viable competitors to the Windows operating system. This is a concern about innovation and, in particular, innovation in markets with strong network effects. The IP Guidelines address concerns about innovation impacts, although not with enough specificity to conclude that disadvantaging a competitor such as Netscape would harm competition. Such an inquiry is 59 IP Guidelines at § 5.4. 60 In markets for intellectual property, where the marginal cost is close to zero, there is some ambiguity about whether giving a product away for free constitutes pricing below cost. Consequently, the DOJ focused on other aspects of Microsoft's bundling strategy, including prohibiting computer manufacturers from uninstalling 22 necessarily fact specific, and it is unlikely that guidance for antitrust policy could productively be crafted in sufficient detail to predict policy conclusions in complex cases such as the Microsoft case. What can be done is to include more discussion of competitive impacts in markets with strong network effects.
Network effects raise the possibility that conduct can "tip" consumer choices to produce outcomes that have persistent adverse effects. In network markets, successful predation does not require the destruction of a competitor. It can be sufficient to damage the competitor enough so that network forces lead to the emergence of a different market leader. Even in markets that have a "winner take all" property, maintaining a level competitive playing field is important for ensuring that the best firm is the winner. At the same time, one must recognize that achieving network effects, like other economies of scale, confer a consumer benefit. The
Justice Department seemed to take this fact into account in seeking a remedy that did not attempt to create additional operating system companies.
In addition to these network issues, the Java allegation in the Microsoft case (and other enforcement actions, such as the Dell case at the FTC 61 ) focused attention on the importance of conduct that interferes with the establishment of industry standards. Such conduct can be an anticompetitive abuse of market power and warrants attention in any future guidelines in the area of innovation and intellectual property.
Much of the conduct challenged in the Microsoft case could be held unlawful without regard to effects on innovation. The tying allegation, the contracts that allegedly excluded competition from rival browsers, and the allegation of monopoly maintenance through predatory conduct are all examples of conduct that could be evaluated from the perspective of price impacts in existing markets for goods and services (in this case, operating systems software and browsers). Such a perspective would be highly incomplete, however. First, a traditional static view might fail to give proper credit to Microsoft's defense that its setting of a zero price for Internet Explorer could allow consumers to benefit from the competition to secure a natural monopoly. In a market without innovation and network effects, pricing below cost might have no purpose other than to secure a monopoly through predatory means, so as to On October 7, 1998, the DOJ filed suit against Visa and MasterCard, the two largest general purpose credit card networks in theUnited States. 64 The lawsuit alleged that Visa and Additionally, the complaint alleged that the defendants and their governing banks have harmed 62 Recognizing that the issue was one of ensuring that consumers reaped the benefits of competition for the monopoly, rather than one of avoiding monopoly altogether, the Department explicitly conceded that charging a zero price for Internet Explorer was not anticompetitive in and of itself. The DOJ's case rests on the theory that the structure of the Visa and MasterCard joint ventures reduces incentives for each party to invest in new products, services, and promotional activities that would "steal" business from the other party. The diminished incentives arise for two reasons. First, because major banks share in the ownership and governance of both associations, the overlapping financial interests reduce the ability of the controlling banks to benefit from innovations that move market share from one association to the other. The governing bodies would either discount the benefits of an innovation because it may harm the other association, or they may require an innovation to be shared by both associations, thereby reducing its value to the innovator. Second, because owners share competitively sensitive information, each association has the ability to learn of and react to competitive initiatives by the other association, thereby reducing the benefits of these initiatives to the moving party.
In general, whether firms have an incentive to invest in the economically efficient level of R&D depends on the extent to which they can appropriate the social benefits of their Standard-setting committees, such as the American National Standards Institute, often have internal rules to assure that the standard-setting process does not unduly create or enhance market power. One of these rules is a requirement that participants in the standard-setting process inform others of any proprietary intellectual property rights owned by the participants that may be necessary to implement the standard. If such rights exist, the owner must agree to license others at terms that are "fair and non-discriminatory."
In 1992, the Video Electronics Standards Association established a standard for the VLbus, a mechanism to transfer instructions between a computer's microprocessor and its peripheral devices. Dell Computer was a participant in the standard-setting process, but did not disclose that it owned intellectual property that was necessary to implement the standard. After computer manufacturers sold more than 1.4 million personal computers incorporating the VLbus, Dell announced its intent to collect royalties. The FTC intervened and accused Dell of engaging in unfair methods of competition by abusing the standard-setting process.
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According to the FTC, Dell's actions hindered industry acceptance of the VL-bus standard pending resolution of the patent issue, deterred companies from using the VL -bus, created uncertainties that increased the costs of using the VL-bus and chilled the willingness of 26 companies to participate in standard-setting efforts. Dell settled the FTC's charges by agreeing not to enforce its patent against computer manufacturers incorporating the VL-bus design.
By requiring disclosure of intellectual property rights, the FTC avoided a possible "hold-up" in which a firm exploits market power created by its ownership of intellectual property that is necessary to implement a standard. 
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addition to the parties to the licensing arrangement possess the required specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage in research and development that is a close substitute of the research and development activities of the parties to the licensing agreement.
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In the FTC's view, however, this argument missed the point, for two reasons: (1) any innovation by a firm that had given a cross-license to Intel could be copied by Intel, and (2) a cross-license would not immunize such a firm from a cut-off of essential trade secrets or a threatened cut-off of physical product.
In response to the FTC's claim that Intel's conduct denied the manufacturers of IBMcompatible computers, such as Digital and Compaq, the ability to benefit from innovations that differentiated their products, Intel argued that it had no cause to object to innovations that increased the values of computers that used its microprocessors, that it often supported such innovations, and that its conduct had no effect on such innovation in any case. 80 In the FTC's view, however, Intel did indeed have an incentive to ensure that no single personal computer manufacturer had proprietary control over important features of such computers, because such control would enable the computer manufacturer to appropriate a larger share of the joint product of the two firms (i.e., the microprocessor plus everything else). Intel claimed that it had a right to withhold competitively sensitive information, that its conduct was appropriate in the context of cross-licensing negotiations, and that its conduct had no discernable effect on competition in any market, specifically including the market for microprocessor innovation.
Did the settlement properly balance the interests of consumers and IP rights-holders?
Both sides presented themselves as champions of intellectual property. In the FTC's view, if
Digital were right that Intel infringed its patents and Digital did not infringe Intel's patents, it ought to be afforded the opportunity to prove that position in court. It should not be forced by
Intel's monopoly position to forgo that right. Indeed, in the FTC's view, it may often be the case that the patent system is the strongest line of defense for a small, innovative company dealing with a larger, dominant rival.
Intel, by contrast, argued that its conduct should not have been challenged, and that IP rights holders should be able to respond vigorously, even by extrajudicial means, to defend themselves against patent litigation. In particular, Intel argued that it had no obligation to 32 supply sensitive trade secrets to a firm that was attempting to extract huge royalties and was seeking an injunction to shut down Intel's production. Furthermore, Intel argued that, by tying its hands in patent disputes, the settlement conditions would make it more difficult to reach procompetitive cross-licensing agreements. Most licensing disputes in the semiconductor industry end in cross-licensing agreements because failure to obtain access to patent portfolios is unacceptable for any party that intends to compete in the industry. By limiting the "damage" that a party can threaten during the course of a licensing dispute, the FTC's terms can encourage parties to hold out for better licensing terms, and thereby delay the conclusion of a cross-license.
Licensing of intellectual property that is complementary to or blocks other intellectual
property is driven by topsy-turvy incentives. Costs incurred during disputes encourage the quick resolution of those disputes, and the "weak" can be more powerful than the "strong."
Consider two parties, each of which owns a patent that is essential to make a product. Party A needs both patents to sell its products. With both patents, it has profits of $2 billion per year, which are offset by sunk expenditures of $1 billion per year (non-sunk costs are included in its profits). Without both products, its profit stream is a negative $1 billion per year. Party B has no product, so its profits with or without the patents are the same, and we normalize them to zero. Suppose the parties bargain over licensing arrangements and evenly split the gains from sharing their intellectual property. 86 The gains from trade in this example are $2 billion, so the licensing arrangement would benefit each party by $1 billion. Thus, party B would wind up with $1 billion and party A would wind up with zero, because its $1 billion share of the gains from trade would merely offset its $1 billion of sunk costs.
This simple example illustrates several important points about licensing complementary patents. The surplus to be divided between the IP rights-holders is the gross surplus excluding sunk costs. The firms are symmetrically situated with respect to claims on this gross surplus, even if one of them has no ability to make or sell the products that embody the patents. In the absence of sunk costs, both parties have the same reservation value (zero) if they fail to reach an agreement, so both parties would be equally well off when they conclude the bargain. If one of the parties has incurred significant sunk costs to produce a product, these sunk costs 33 disadvantage the party in the patent bargain. This is the sense in which the "weak" (party B, which has no product) can be more powerful than the "strong" (party A, which has valuable products) in patent bargaining.
As noted above, many firms own patents that read on microprocessors. Suppose that ten parties each own a patent that is necessary to make and sell a microprocessor. Assume the same numbers as above; i.e., one firm can earn profits of $2 billion with $1 billion in sunk costs if it has rights to all the patents, and the other nine firms earn nothing with their patents. The same reasoning as above suggests that each of the nine firms that only own patents can claim licensing fees of 1/10 x ($2 billion) = $200 million. The firm with the sunk costs would be left with 1/10 x ($2 billion) -$1 billion, for a net loss of $800 million.
These examples assume that all sunk costs result from investments necessary to produce the product and that no sunk costs result from investments to produce the patented innovation.
The point remains, however, that in bargaining over the returns from a product that depends upon patented inventions held in a large number of different hands, there can be no assurance that the distribution of returns will be anywhere near optimal. In particular, after royalty payments to IP rights holders, a firm might have little profit incentive to invest in the facilities required to manufacture and sell its product.
Cross-licensing is an efficient alternative to unilateral royalty obligations. However, in the microprocessor industry, incentives to engage in cross-licensing arrangements are driven by the desire to sell products, not by the desire to sell intellectual property.
The FTC v. Intel settlement was a compromise between the view that cross-licensing arrangements are procompetitive and should be encouraged and the view that Intel's market position requires restraint in responding to challenges of patent infringement lest other patentees be deprived of all rewards. The settlement explicitly gave Intel the right to withhold technical information and pre-release products from any party that sought to enjoin Intel's sales of its microprocessors. The settlement prohibited such tactics only in response to a suit for damages. Thus the settlement acknowledged that the rewards for other innovators, even if they did not produce a product, should not be zero. It also recognized Intel's position that the threat of an injunction against an infringer was likely to do more harm than good in this context. This compromise, however, involves a leap of faith that the damages awarded by a patent court will not be excessive in light of the potential harm from large, multiple "pancaked" royalties.
situations such as encountered in the Intel case? Most significantly, it may say something about the limits of the analogy between intellectual property and other forms of property. As noted above, 87 intellectual property differs from other forms of property in several respects, two of which are relevant here: (1) the frequency of disputes over the boundaries of each person's property, and (2) the degree to which multiple complements may be necessary in order to produce a product. As a result, appropriate public policy may be exceptionally difficult to discern in circumstances like those alleged to have existed in FTC v. Intel. On the one hand,
Intel advanced some compelling arguments that patents were a positive hindrance to the very existence of a product in this market. On the other hand, if the FTC were right that Intel was a monopolist and was using its monopoly power to prevent other firms from reaping a reward from their inventions, it is not at all clear that leaving the patents in place but allowing Intel to escape their effects would yield the best possible result.
E. FTC Generic Drug Cases
The IP Guidelines recognize that:
[s]ettlements involving the cross-licensing of intellectual property rights can be an efficient means to avoid litigation and, in general, courts favor such settlements. When such cross-licensing involves horizontal competitors, however, the agencies will consider whether the effect of the settlement is to diminish competition among entities that would have been actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the cross-license. In the absence of offsetting efficiencies, such settlements may be challenged as unlawful restraints of trade.
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The FTC has challenged settlements involving owners of drug patents and their generic equivalents on three occasions. 89 The first was a settlement between Abbott and Geneva involving Hytrin, Abbott's brand name hypertension and prostate drug. The second settlement was between Hoechst Marion Roussel (now Aventis) and the Andrx Corporation involving the hypertension and angina drug Cardizem CD. 90 The third involved settlements between Schering-Plough and Upshur-Smith and between Schering-Plough and the ESI-Lederle division of American Home Products involving the potassium supplement K-Dur. 91 The FTC is also investigating an agreement between Bristol-Meyers-Squibb and American Biosciences regarding the cancer drug Taxol 92 and the Commission has issued a proposal to conduct a study of generic drug competition that would focus on potentially anticompetitive agreements between brand-name and generic drug-makers. ANDA allows generic manufacturers to sidestep the lengthy Federal Drug Administration approval process for a new drug by demonstrating that the generic is bioequivalent to an already approved drug product (the reference drug). However the ANDA applicant also must certify that the reference drug is not patented, the patent has expired or will expire, or that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the generic product. This latter claim is called a "Paragraph IV" certification. If the applicant makes a Paragraph IV certification, the FDA will stay the approval of the ANDA for the earlier of 30 months or the issuance of a non-appealable court decision finding the patent invalid or not infringed, provided that the patentee initiates a patent infringement suit against the applicant within 45 days from the date of the certification.
Importantly, the Act also provides that the first applicant to submit an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is protected from competition from subsequent generic versions of the same drug for a period of 180 days. This 180-day exclusivity lasts from the earlier of (i) the date of a 36 court decision holding the patent invalid or not infringed or (ii) the date the generic manufacturer begins marketing the drug.
The 180-day exclusivity period was intended to encourage generic manufacturers to challenge weak drug patents or to design non-infringing drug products by rewarding these firms with a period of limited competition. 94 In practice, however, the Act also creates a prime opportunity for parties to avoid competition. The generic company that is the first applicant for an ANDA can agree to drop or delay a challenge to the validity of the patent in exchange for compensation from the patentee. This will eliminate competition from the generic company for however long the agreement provides. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. If the generic company also agrees not to relinquish or transfer its entitlement to the 180-day exclusivity period, no other firm can market a generic until the first applicant's 180-day exclusivity period expires. This could be much later than the earliest date at which a generic supplier could survive a preliminary injunction from the patentee.
The agreements between Abbott and Geneva over Hytrin and between Aventis and 37 that the payments to Geneva exceeded the profits it was likely to earn as a supplier of a generic form of Hytrin. According to the complaint, Schering-Plough agreed to pay Upshur-Smith and ESI $60 million and up to $30 million, respectively. In part, these payments were ostensibly for licensing certain products to Schering-Plough, but the FTC alleged that the payments were unrelated to, and greatly exceeded, the value of those products, if any, to Schering-Plough.
Based on the allegations in the public record materials, these agreements appear to be anticompetitive arrangements to eliminate competition and to divide the monopoly profits of successful branded drugs. The IP Guidelines recognize such hazards and these concerns were amplified in a speech by Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein. 95 However, these cases are not as simple as they may appear. Courts recognize the rights of parties in litigation to settle their differences privately, and parties may have legitimate interests in a patent settlement that does not involve anticompetitive objectives. Parties have an incentive to negotiate a settlement if the total economic value that the parties could achieve in a settlement exceeds the total economic value they could achieve by proceeding with litigation. The settlement value can be higher because settling may avoid litigation costs or provide an opportunity for the parties to structure arrangements that add social value to the products at issue (such as coordinating the pricing and supply of complementary products). These are potentially procompetitive benefits from settling a patent dispute. Unfortunately, settlement of a patent dispute also involves the welfare of third parties (that is, consumers of patented drugs) who have an interest in the outcome of the litigation. Consequently, settlements can be privately profitable, but socially undesirable because consumers who may be affected by the settlement are not present at the bargaining table.
The limits placed on the ability of a patentee to settle validity suits affects the protection afforded by the patent grant and should be considered in the context of patent policy more generally. Permitting a patentee to settle a dispute over the validity of the patent effectively extends the breadth of the patent grant. If the patent is indeed invalid, settlement allows the patentee to reap a reward even though it has failed to achieve a patentable innovation. other hand, prohibiting a settlement incurs the risk that a court may erroneously conclude that a patent is invalid.
96
In response to the FTC's complaint, Aventis argued that its actions were a legitimate attempt to protect its patent against an infringing product. According to Aventis, the settlement What can be done to distinguish potentially procompetitive settlements from those that are likely to be anticompetitive? The fact that the settlement involves a payment from the patentee to the challenger is not sufficient to determine that the settlement is anticompetitive. The 96 To the extent that the judicial system would grant a preliminary injunction to prevent generic sales if the patent is likely to be valid, permitting the patentee to settle with the generic challenger may err too far in the direction of sustaining invalid patents. Note that similar arguments apply to suits where the issue is infringement rather than validity. savings in transactions costs and the risk-allocation benefits could outweigh the potential benefits from a finding of invalidity. Furthermore, parties could attempt to hide payments, for example by offering concessions on other products. We suggest the following factors as a guide to assess these settlements. However, none of these conditions, standing alone, is sufficient to determine that a settlement is anticompetitive.
Concerns should be greater if the size of the payment from the patentee to the challenger is a large fraction of the monopoly profits from the patented drug. This would suggest that the patentee has a high expectation that the patent is invalid.
Concerns should be greater if the transactions costs that are saved by a settlement are small.
Concerns should be greater if the settlement has not been subjected to judicial review (and ideally, inspection and comment by third parties).
Concerns should be greater if the patentee would not have been likely to obtain a preliminary injunction against the generic challenger.
Concerns should be greater if the terms of the settlement clearly delay the date at which a judicial finding of invalidity is likely to occur. In other words, once the FTC concluded that the two parties were in fact horizontal competitors --i.e., that they could have competed absent licenses to each other--then it followed that any remaining efficiencies from allowing amicable settlement of patent disputes should be balanced against anticompetitive harms in the same manner as other efficiencies.
This approach seems consistent with a literal reading of the IP Guidelines, which frames the issue in terms of whether there would have been competition absent the license. Moreover, it may provide the right incentive --to avoid excessive restriction on competition --to the parties, who are best positioned to assess whether their respective patent positions truly justify a severe restriction on competition. On the other hand, there is no doubt that this approach places a difficult counseling burden on the parties, who must make their decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
In evaluating two other examples of patent pooling arrangements --the MPEG and DVD patent pools --the DOJ reached a different conclusion. However, these pooling arrangements, which we discuss below, included important competitive safeguards. A key distinction in the MPEG and DVD proposals was the employment of a patent expert to make an independent determination of whether patents were essential to use the MPEG and the DVD technologies. Only patents that were essential to use the technology were supposed to be included in the pool. Citing the IP Guidelines, both business review letters noted that the pooling of essential patents may provide procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation. At the same time, by limiting the pools only to essential patents, the arrangement avoids the risk that the pool would eliminate competition between technological alternatives. The combination of patents in the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger would not have been limited to those patents that were essential to practice particular gene therapies. Similarly, the VISX pool had no provision to limit the pool to essential patents.
The FTC noted that the accumulation of patents in the Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz merger could raise barriers to entry even if the patents were complementary. The merged company might be unwilling to license its patents and it would be difficult for competitors to invent around the merged company's large patent portfolio. The DOJ concluded that the MPEG and the DVD 43 patent pools did not raise similar concerns. The pools did not limit the ability of firms to license individual patents. Furthermore, the pools were obligated to offer non-exclusive licenses to all takers at non-discriminatory terms and the royalty rates appeared to be small relative to the values of the products in which the technologies would be used. These facts appeared to mitigate concerns that the pool might raise barriers to entry or otherwise foreclose competition.
Following the IP Guidelines, patent pooling arrangements raise concerns if they affect competition that would have occurred in the absence of the pool. The FTC concluded that Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz could have competed with each other or facilitated competition by others if they did not combine their patent portfolios. Similarly, the FTC concluded that the VISX pool eliminated competition that could have occurred in its absence, or at least was not structured to avoid such an effect. In contrast, the MPEG and DVD pools employed safeguards to limit the pools to essential patents, which by definition are necessary to practice the technology and hence not substitutes for each other. An additional consideration with respect to the MPEG and DVD pools is that the competition that may have occurred in the absence of these arrangements would have been a "standards war" that could have delayed the arrival of these technologies, to the detriment of consumers.
V. IS INNOVATION "KING" AT THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES?
As discussed above, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of antitrust actions at the agencies that allege effects on innovation. The number of merger cases that include allegations of innovation effects has increased from only four in the first half of the 1990s to forty seven in the second half of the decade. Several non-merger civil cases brought in the second half of the decade deal directly with innovation effects.
However, a closer look shows that a substantial majority of the merger cases that allege effects on innovation also exceed the Merger Guidelines thresholds that raise serious concerns about competitive effects in markets for existing goods and services. Assuming that the other conditions for sustaining a challenge to a merger were satisfied, such as high barriers to entry, these are all transactions that likely would have been challenged without regard to their impacts on innovation. This does not mean that innovation was unimportant in the agencies' calculus.
It simply means that, had innovation been excluded from the analysis, it is unlikely that in these case the enforcement decision would have been different.
The eight or so merger cases in which innovation concerns were central to the enforcement decision or to the choice of remedies reflect a belief at the agencies that competition is good for research and development, just as competition is good for consumers in existing product markets. In this respect, the agencies' orientation with respect to innovation reinforces their traditional posture with respect to competition in existing product markets. We believe the agencies' desire to preserve competition in research and development is appropriate.
However we also note that the basis for this conclusion is largely anecdotal. Economic theory does not prove that more competition is better for R&D and statistical studies do not support that conclusion either. At the same time, neither economic theory nor statistical studies support a conclusion that highly concentrated markets promote R&D, and there is considerable anecdotal evidence to the contrary. Microsoft case does raise innovation-related issues that future guidelines should address.
Network effects were an important element in the Microsoft case. Network effects contributed to high barriers to entry in the market for personal computer operating system software and Microsoft's challenged conduct was designed to protect these high barriers to entry by undermining the competitive significance of alternative technologies, such as browsers and the Java language, that are not specific to the Windows platform.
Innovation was central to the government's case against Visa and MasterCard. That case focuses on structural conditions in the credit card industry that limit innovation by the two dominant credit card companies. Other cases, such as the FTC challenges of settlements with generic drug competitors and the DOJ's business reviews of the MPEG and DVD patent pools, deal squarely with innovation issues and particularly the intersection of intellectual property rights and the antitrust laws.
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Based on mere numbers, innovation has not been "King" at the antitrust agencies. Most cases brought by the agencies are decided by anticipated price impacts in traditional goods markets. However, innovation concerns have been critical in a handful of merger cases and in several prominent non-merger cases. These enforcement actions have dealt with competition issues that have profound consequences for consumers. In this respect, the status of innovation competition as a dimension of antitrust enforcement has been elevated dramatically in the latter half of the 1990s, and we believe appropriately so.
VI. HAVE THE AGENCIES' ACTIONS BEEN CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDELINES, AND IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE NEEDED?
We are not aware of any antitrust action by the agencies since 1995 that was plainly inconsistent with the IP Guidelines. The IP Guidelines state:
The competitive effects of licensing arrangements often can be adequately assessed within the relevant markets for the goods affected by the arrangements. In such instances, the agencies will delineate and analyze only goods markets. In other cases, however, the analysis may require the delineation of markets for technology or markets for research and development (innovation markets). Nor does such market power impose on the intellectual property owner an obligation to license the use of that property to others. As in other antitrust contexts, however, market power could be illegally acquired or maintained, or, even if lawfully acquired and maintained, would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual property owner to harm competition through unreasonable conduct in connection with such property.
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This advice is sufficiently ambiguous to allow broad discretion for intervention, such as that which occurred in FTC v. Intel. A key issue with regard to unilateral licensing should be the extent to which a company uses its market power in a way that discourages innovation generally. This is an innovation markets analysis. The issue was raised in the Intel case, and the parties disagreed as to its impacts.
The FTC's actions in the Intel case apply to a situation to which the IP Guidelines had devoted relatively little attention: what appropriate ways exist to deal with situations in which patents are so numerous and widely distributed that it becomes difficult to produce a product at all without infringement? Future guidelines would provide a service by elaborating on the benefits of cross-licensing arrangements in these circumstances and on the range of permissible conduct in the course of cross-licensing negotiations.
